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Commentary: The emergence of an epidemic or pandemic presents significant 
challenges for public health communication. The shifting and uncertain nature 
of an epidemic or pandemic necessitates a dynamic communication strategy. 
However, negotiating uncertainty and information gaps can be challenging 
for both government and media. This commentary focuses on two aspects of 
selected Australian media commentary on the COVID-19 pandemic: media 
commentators’ negotiation of gaps in the available information about the 
pandemic and commentators’ assessment of perceived initial inconsistency 
in the government’s public health messaging. It analyses how a perceived 
inability to reconcile gaps in the expert advice can be interpreted by media 
commentators as an indication of public health communication failure. 
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ON 7 APRIL 2020, the Australian federal government released the details of the epidemiological modelling that had informed its approach to man-aging the spread of the novel coronavirus disease, COVID-19, caused by 
the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2), in Australia 
(Grattan, 2020). Reports noted that the epidemiological model used data from in-
ternational contexts to map various scenarios and predict the likely progression of 
the spread of the disease in Australia with the introduction of targeted restrictions. 
Prior to the release of this information, a few media commentators had demanded 
that the government release the expert advice it had received so that it could 
be publicly scrutinised (Bowtell, 2020). The government’s graded approach to 
restricting public movement and business activity had been criticised, but, after 
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the release of the modelling data, a few commentators affirmed the government’s 
approach and highlighted its efficacy (Scott & Sas, 2020). This commentary fo-
cuses on two aspects of selected Australian media commentary on the COVID-19 
pandemic: media commentators’ negotiation of gaps in the available information 
about the emerging pandemic (specifically in the early phase of the pandemic), 
and commentators’ assessment of perceived initial inconsistency in the govern-
ment’s public health messaging. These aspects relate to the critical importance of 
trust in coverage of health information (Furlan, 2012). 
Media coverage of a pandemic plays a critical public awareness role
Media coverage of a pandemic plays a critical role in how public awareness 
of the pandemic develops and how the community perceives government re-
sponses to the pandemic (Davis & Lohm, 2020; Dudo, Dahlstrom, & Bros-
sard, 2007; Pieri, 2019; Yan, Tang, Gabriele, & Wu, 2016). The media’s con-
ceptualisation of scientific uncertainty during a pandemic can influence public 
perception of the government’s containment efforts (Holland, Blood, Imison, 
Chapman, & Fogarty, 2012); ‘responsible reporting on scientific uncertainty’ 
serves to inform (rather than alarm) the public (Hilton & Hunt, 2011). Media 
coverage in Australia and New Zealand of an emerging pandemic with serious 
health-related, economic and social consequences can influence public health 
messaging in the wider region (Cullen, 2003, 2014). Research on Australian 
media coverage of previous pandemics suggests that the media generally tends 
to focus on disseminating scientific information on emerging threats, highlight-
ing the potential seriousness of these threats while avoiding alarmist language 
(Fogarty et al., 2011; Holland & Blood, 2010; Holland et al., 2012). In Aus-
tralia, amid saturation media coverage of the covid-19 pandemic in its early 
phase (ABC, 2020c), uncertainty about the possible trajectory of the spread 
of COVID-19 and the efficacy of government interventions shaped the tone of 
some media commentary on the government’s public health messaging. Some 
criticisms of the government’s public health messages demonstrated dissatis-
faction about scientific uncertainty about COVID-19; some of these criticisms 
were made by commentators with experience of public health communication 
(Bowtell, 2020). Sociologists Mark Davis and Davina Lohm, writing about the 
2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic in their book Pandemics, Publics and Narra-
tive (2020), comment on the challenges involved in developing and engaging 
with ‘narratives’ about pandemics: 
A central communication challenge [during] the 2009 pandemic was ad-
vising publics throughout the world to prepare themselves for a possible 
health catastrophe, but without inspiring panic and therefore jeopardising 
effective government. (Davis & Lohm, 2020)
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This became a central challenge in the initial response to the COVID-19 
pandemic in Australia (and other countries). As in the 2009 influenza pandemic, 
some commentators’ reactions to the initial public health messaging in 2020 in 
Australia evinced dissatisfaction about a perceived lack of  urgency and ‘neces-
sary’ alarmism (Vasterman & Ruigrok, 2013) in the government’s public health 
communications (Davis & Lohm, 2020). 
Given the high level of transmissibility of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, media 
reporting on the emerging pandemic, from early on, highlighted the role of in-
dividual judgment and responsibility in containing the disease. Notions about 
individuals’ responsibility to self-isolate and avoid contact with others if sick 
featured prominently in the early media coverage (McIlroy, 2020). These notions 
also shaped media commentary on politicians’ judgment about matters relating 
to their personal conduct. Supposedly ‘irresponsible’ actions by politicians, in 
the early phases of the pandemic, were highlighted as evidence of their initially 
lackadaisical approach to the unfolding crisis, and, particularly, their lax approach 
to promoting ‘social distancing’ (AusGov, 2020) (in contrast to the stringent 
approaches to enforcing social distancing that were later adopted in Australia) 
(Worthington, 2020). These notions about individual acts of irresponsible (though 
seemingly unpremeditated and innocuous) conduct inflected analysis of govern-
ment responses to the pandemic. For instance, before widespread COVID-19 
cases were reported in the US, news coverage of  a journalist’s question during 
a White House press conference about whether US President Donald Trump’s 
personal conduct at public events had been careless (the journalist noted, for 
example, that he had continued to shake hands publicly, and had chosen not to 
immediately take a diagnostic test after a meeting with a Brazilian delegation, 
some of whom had tested positive for SARS-CoV-2) became a part of wider 
critiques of the US government’s perceived initial inaction (Haltiwanger, 2020). 
Similarly, in Australia, media reports highlighted perceived inconsistencies in 
Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s approach to promoting social distancing to man-
age the spread of COVID-19. Reports highlighted an inconsistency between the 
government’s notification of the cancellation of all events involving more than 
500 people from March 16 and the Prime Minister’s statement that he would 
continue to attend a football match on the weekend before this date as planned 
(Murphy, 2020a). The Prime Minister was criticised for making this statement, 
which was deemed irresponsible because it had the potential to confuse and 
mislead the public about the appropriateness of attending large public events 
(Murphy, 2020a). He ultimately chose to not attend the match in question, saying 
that his attendance would be ‘misrepresented’ (Murphy, 2020a). 
On March 13, the Federal government instituted an emergency national 
cabinet comprising the Prime Minister and the Premiers of all the states and 
territories. The deliberations and decisions of this cabinet were supported by 
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the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) (which includes 
the Chief Health Officers of all the states and territories, and is chaired by the 
Federal Chief Medical Officer). As the COVID-19 pandemic grew, this inter-
governmental mechanism became the primary source of public health information 
for the media, with the Prime Minister and Chief Medical Officer jointly present-
ing regular national briefings to journalists. At the state level, the Premiers and 
Chief Health Officers presented local briefings. The epidemiological modelling 
that was released on April 7 was presented to and used by this body to develop 
its graded lockdown interventions (Worthington, 2020). The release of this data 
was a reaction to media commentary critical of the government’s decision-making 
around its graded lockdown approach (Dalzell, 2020). The epidemiologists who 
produced the modelling supported the government’s graded lockdown approach 
and noted that the government had developed its interventions in accordance 
with the expert advice (Scott & Sas, 2020). The following section highlights 
two examples of how media commentators, in the early phases of the spread of 
COVID-19 in Australia, negotiated gaps in the available information and how 
commentators’ expectations regarding the still-inchoate information influenced 
criticism of the government’s health advice. 
Before the introduction of a graded nation-wide lockdown on March 22 
and the release of the aforementioned epidemiological modelling data, a sense 
of dissatisfaction about the quality of the government’s public health messag-
ing began to emerge in some media commentary. Instances of commentary on 
talk shows broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), for 
example, show that, even at a time when definitive information about the emerg-
ing pandemic was not yet available, commentators’ expectations regarding the 
consistency and accuracy of information shaped critique of the government’s 
incipient public health response. The ABC’s Insiders programme on March 15 
featured an interview with Federal Health Minister Greg Hunt and Chief Medical 
Officer Brendan Murphy, alongside a panel discussion, with invited journalists, 
focused on the latest developments in the news coverage of COVID-19 (ABC, 
2020d). On March 13, Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton’s office announced 
that he had tested positive for COVID-19 (Murphy, 2020a). The panellists dis-
cussed whether Dutton may have been infectious at the time of a cabinet meeting 
he had attended three days before his diagnosis was confirmed and speculated 
about how he may have acquired the infection. Panellist Peter van Onselen, a 
journalist, highlighted a purported inconsistency between the WHO’s advice 
and the Australian Department of Health’s advice about how long a person 
remained infectious while speculating about whether Dutton may have been 
infectious at the time of the meeting. Hunt and Murphy were asked about this 
supposed inconsistency, and when Murphy argued that the emerging data was 
not definitive, Onselen noted that the exchange reflected a lack of precision in 
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the government’s public health communication. The host of the show, David 
Speers, asked for definitive information about whether people could engage in a 
number of activities (for example, take public transport, go to a cinema or gym, 
and attend events). Speers insisted on definitive advice despite Murphy’s com-
ments that it was difficult to take a blanket approach to these issues in light of 
the available information, and that the pandemic in Australia had not yet reached 
a stage where quarantine measures of the kind then in place in China, Italy and 
France were necessary; Murphy encouraged people to exercise their judgment 
regarding these matters, taking into consideration factors such as whether the 
activity was essential, they were ill and had symptoms of infection, and they 
belonged to an at-risk demographic. 
Inconsistency in federal and state advice
Speers pointed to an inconsistency in federal and state advice about buying es-
sentials in advance (Murphy recommended shopping for no more than a few 
days’ provisions in advance, whereas the Chief Health Officer in the state of 
Victoria recommended that people buy two weeks’ provisions in advance). This 
inconsistency was later highlighted by the media panellists as evidence of an 
overall lack of consistency in the public health messages that were then emerg-
ing from different official sources in Australia. Murphy contested this assess-
ment, noting that there may have been differences in how different officials 
interpreted consensus-based information about the suitability of some degree of 
domestic preparation for at-home isolation, as well as differences in messages 
based on jurisdictional needs. The discussion among the media panellists that 
followed the interview with Hunt and Murphy focused on what were perceived 
as unresolved inconsistencies in the government’s communication, particularly 
conflicting advice regarding the suitability of various activities at that stage 
of the pandemic. Media commentary published after this show re-emphasised 
these discussion points, reiterating criticism of the government’s alleged failure 
to communicate appropriately (Brown, 2020). 
On the March 16 edition of ABC’s Q&A, a talk show in which invited 
panellists respond to curated questions from a live audience, William Bowtell, 
a policy adviser, accused another panellist, Federal Minister for Aged Care and 
Senior Australians Richard Colbeck, of spreading misinformation (ABC, 2020d). 
Colbeck responded to a question about efforts to protect the health of older Aus-
tralians, particularly residents of aged care homes, by noting that the available 
epidemiological information and health advice indicated that older people were 
at greater risk of becoming ill. Bowtell questioned Colbeck about the accuracy 
of this information, suggesting that he was misinformed and, crucially, spreading 
misinformation. Bowtell stated that current information on the situation in New 
South Wales indicated that most of those who had tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 
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were under 60. Colbeck replied that the advice that his ministry had received 
was that older people were at greater risk of dying from the disease, and that his 
ministry had undertaken efforts to ensure that aged care homes were prepared 
for quarantine measures and other interventions in accordance with this advice. 
Bowtell insisted that this was emblematic of the government’s misinformed ap-
proach. He argued that Colbeck had relied on lazy assumptions and demanded 
that he publish the advice that he had received for public verification. Bowtell 
later published a commentary that reiterated these criticisms, claiming: ‘Our 
politicians are not fit to oversee the coronavirus response. It’s time they got out 
of the way.’ (Bowtell, 2020)
The above examples reflect a mismatch between commentators’ expecta-
tions regarding the robustness and accuracy of information about the unfolding 
pandemic and the inherent limitations of this information. It can be argued that 
commentators’ expectations may be unrealistic in view of these limitations 
(and competing considerations in government decision-making), leading to 
necessary public health messages, such as those highlighting the vulnerability 
of older people and the need for restrictions on access to aged care homes, still 
being criticised. In relation to the latter example, whereas the published epide-
miological information indicated that older people were at greater risk of dying 
from COVID-19 (Bedford et al., 2020), and Colbeck’s comments on the ABC 
could only be considered appropriate given this (then emerging and inchoate) 
information, an alleged inconsistency in the advice was interpreted as evidence 
of government-promoted ‘misinformation’ (Bowtell, 2020). 
Announcements about graded closures of business activity and public 
movement (starting on March 22) by the government were criticised for being 
inconsistent and difficult to grasp (Brown, 2020; Murphy, 2020b; Soden, 2020). 
For example, media commentators perceived an initial refusal to close schools 
and child-care facilities as inconsistent with broader efforts to limit people’s 
movement and exposure to infection (Hunter, 2020). The public health messag-
ing and the decision-making processes underpinning it were deemed by media 
commentators to be inconsistent, in large part because they perceived the graded 
lockdown process and the absence of easily understood guidance as unsuitable 
for the circumstances (Murphy, 2020b; Wilkinson, 2020). Interestingly, after the 
government-commissioned epidemiological modelling data were released to the 
media on April 7, a few media reports and commentaries affirmed the govern-
ment’s graded approach (Doherty, 2020; Grattan, 2020; Scott & Sas, 2020). 
The political ramifications of public health messaging during an epidemic 
or pandemic can be significant. Based on the examples of media commentary 
cited here, there are two issues that need to be discussed. The first relates to 
consistency of the message. Government representatives undertaking media 
engagement need to account for expectations of consistency in the message. 
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Media commentaries highlighting perceived inconsistencies, even in the ab-
sence of definitive information, demonstrate that an expectation of consistency 
will be a primary determinant of how public health information is received by 
the media. This expectation should inform government decision-making about 
its public health messaging, and, even in the absence of definitive information, 
consistency in governments’ messages across jurisdictions should be prioritised. 
Examples of inconsistency may be perceived by media commentators as indica-
tions of government mismanagement (Murphy, 2020b). Where the public health 
advice is inconsistent, or where a graded or differential approach is required, 
the relevant information pertaining to the substance of this advice should be 
disclosed to provide justification for the perceived inconsistency or differential 
approach. This will enable an appropriate acknowledgement of the factors that 
have shaped the public health message.
The second issue that should be highlighted is a lack of acknowledgement 
of the limitations of the information or advice that may be available to the 
government at any given point during an epidemic or pandemic. Journalists 
and commentators with greater experience of reporting on epidemics and other 
public health emergencies will likely demonstrate more of an appreciation of 
these limitations. While it is expected that the media will scrutinise the adequacy 
of government efforts to manage a pandemic, it is questionable whether high-
lighting dissensus on official health advice based on incomplete information 
or inchoate expert advice is conducive to better public health messaging. The 
media’s reporting of gaps in the emerging information on specific aspects of an 
epidemic or pandemic (for example, information about the apparent risk profile 
for specific demographics) may serve to educate the public. However, when the 
incompleteness of this information is used to cast doubt on official health advice, 
the effect on public health efforts may be deleterious. Conflicting perspectives 
on the ‘correctness’ of health advice (without adequate acknowledgement of the 
limitations of the available information) can undermine public health messaging 
during an epidemic or pandemic, possibly leading to mistrust of health advice 
from the government (Economist, 2020). This was the message that the Public 
Health Association of Australia (PHAA) sought to promote when it wrote to its 
members asking them not to criticise the efforts of the AHPPC and the public 
health professionals advising it on the COVID-19 pandemic through media 
commentary. It argued that using media appearances to challenge, undermine 
or generate uncertainty around the advice provided by the committee would ‘in-
crease confusion and anxiety’ (Baum & Laris, 2020). Some members criticised 
this advice, to which the PHAA replied:
It was not our intention to stop or stifle evidence-informed debate . . . At 
a time of significant confusion and anxiety, our intention was to reinforce 
the best available public health advice—[that of] the Australian Health 
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Protection Principal Committee. We remain of the view that this is cur-
rently the best available structure to lead the response to this crisis and 
advise government. (Sweet, 2020)
Conclusion
The emergence of an epidemic or pandemic caused by a novel pathogen neces-
sitates significant public health communication from governments and there 
are numerous challenges involved in both developing and engaging with me-
dia coverage of the epidemic or pandemic (Davis & Lohm, 2020; Dudo et al., 
2007; Pieri, 2019; Vasterman & Ruigrok, 2013). This commentary notes that 
the level of consistency of the public health information that is provided by 
government is a critical factor that shapes reception of public health advice 
(Yan et al., 2016). Both government representatives and media commentators 
face significant challenges in negotiating critical gaps in the available infor-
mation, and need to account for public expectations regarding the consistency 
of advice (Dudo et al., 2007). A more sophisticated approach to negotiating 
gaps in the emerging information and communicating uncertainties and a co-
ordinated approach to disseminating critical information—particularly infor-
mation about interventions such as lockdowns—is required. The news media 
serves a critical function in disseminating public health information. Media 
coverage of significant health events (particularly pandemics) in Australia and 
New Zealand can have wider ramifications in the region (Cullen, 2003, 2014). 
In New Zealand, the government was lauded for the clarity of its public health 
messages and broader public health strategy (Richter, 2020). Public broadcast-
ers particularly play a key role in shaping how the government’s public health 
advice is received. The success of special broadcasts or resources developed on 
COVID-19, such as the ABC’s Coronacast podcast programme (ABC, 2020a), 
demonstrates that there is a high level of public interest in media content on 
health emergencies (2020b). Media commentary on the validity of government 
advice, which will necessarily and inevitably evolve in response to changing 
circumstances, should explicitly acknowledge the limitations within which 
such advice is developed and proffered. Media commentators’ demands for 
definitive information and stringent recommendations during an epidemic or 
pandemic may be justified. However, an acknowledgment of the limitations of 
the information that may be available through the vicissitudes of an epidemic or 
pandemic caused by a novel pathogen would be appropriate and help contextu-
alise key public health messages. 
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